The key challenge to integrate the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) into airspace is to develop a means to sense and avoid (SAA) other aircrafts. The main function of the SAA is self-separation, i.e. remaining ''well clear'' of the other aircrafts. The separation thresholds must be quantitatively defined for the UAS to autonomously maintain self-separation. In this paper, the separation thresholds are defined quantitatively for the UAS in a dynamic airspace full of aircrafts that differ in motion state and performance. Then, a ''sector-like'' dynamic collision-free region (CFR) was set up around the UAS. The size of the CRF can be adjusted adaptively according to the relative motion states of the surrounding intruders, the performance of the UAS, and the altitude of the airspace. The simulation results show that the proposed adaptive separation thresholds adapted to the dynamic airspace environment better than the fixed separation thresholds recommended by Sense & Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP), and controlled the missing and false alarm rates on low levels. This means our adaptive separation thresholds can effectively balance the safety and operation efficiency of the airspace.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of artificial intelligence and aircraft industry, unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), a.k.a. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been growing in quantity and diversity in recent years [1] . Compared with manned aircrafts, the UAS can be manufactured and applied at a low cost, and work long hours in complex environments. Therefore, the UAS is very suitable for dangerous, drudgery and dirty tasks and operations. The above features imply a great potential for application in such fields as logistics, plant protection, search and rescue missions and border patrol [2] . For example, Google, Amazon, UPS, DHL and SF Express have all piloted parcel shipment with the UAS [3] . The advancement of UAS technology and application makes it necessary to integrate the UAS to the current national airspace system (NAS) [4, 5] .
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The key challenge to integrate the unmanned aircraft system (UAS) into airspace is to develop a means to sense and avoid (SAA) other aircrafts [6] - [8] . The SAA has two main functions: self-separation assurance and collision avoidance [9] , [10] . The self-separation assurance, aiming to keep the UAS ''well clear'' of other aircrafts, is generally achieved through gentle and elegant maneuvers. The collision avoidance, aiming to prevent imminent collision, is mostly realized through emergency, aggressive maneuvers [11] . To ensure the UAS security, more emphasis should be given to self-separation assurance than collision avoidance.
The separation thresholds must be quantitatively defined for the UAS to autonomously maintain self-separation, which currently are mainly determined subjectively by pilots [12] . The Sense & Avoid Science and Research Panel (SARP), a US agency established in 2011, considers the quantitative definition of separation thresholds for UAS the top priority in future research [13] . The UAS mainly flies in VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ low-altitude non-regulated airspace, which is highly dynamic and heterogenous. Such an airspace is thronged with aircrafts of different motion states and performances. In such a dynamic airspace, the difficulty of quantitatively defining the thresholds is to maintain flight safety while minimizing the safety risk of normal operation of the NAS. If the separation thresholds are too small, the UAS will have no time to avoid collision into high-speed flying intruders; if the separation thresholds are too large, the UAS will make many unnecessary avoidance maneuvers, and thus affect the normal operation of airspace traffic. Therefore, the crux of defining separation thresholds is to strike a balance between airspace safety and operation efficiency.
Recently, some scholars and institutes have explored the airspace integration of UAS and modelled the separation boundaries for separation assurance [13] - [19] . MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MIT LL) defined well clear (WC) by risk-based method, and proposed a time (τ )-based concept with distance modifications [14] . In 2011, Weibel et al. transformed the separation of UAS into the WC threshold, and derived the WC boundary value from the acceptable risk (target safety level) threshold, according to the minimum separation standard of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Furthermore, NASA developed a set of WC boundary models based on the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II Resolution Advisory Logic, and out forward a closest point of approach (CPA) and timeto-CPA concept [15] . In 2015, Marcus Johnson et al. from NASA conducted a fast-time simulation on the Airspace Concept Evaluation System (ACES), and compared the WC definitions of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), and the TCAS II in terms of their risks on the hybrid operation of unmanned and manned aircrafts in the airspace and their impacts on the airspace. They also evaluated how the conflict alarm logic affects the UAS operator's maintenance of the WC from the other aircrafts [16] . In addition, the US Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) proposed an ellipsoidal concept defined by aircraft speed and flight altitude by stressing analyses via six-degree of freedom simulation [13] . Based on the above findings, the SARP conducted an integrated analysis to compare the WCs defined by the MIT, the NASA and the USAF, and came up with a quantified definition of the WC for large UAS to RTCA SC-228 [13] . Moreover, Mullins et al. designed the dynamic separation threshold for the sense and avoid (SAA) system of the UAS in 2013, replaced the distance-based threshold with time-based threshold, considering the performance of intruding aircraft, and developed a solution with small computing cost using turning geometry [17] . In 2017, Duffield and McLain studied the WC definition for the airspace with dense UAS based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) [18] .
The above studies have contributed greatly to the quantitative definition of the separation thresholds of UAS. Most of them focus on medium to large UAS in general airspace environment, and define fixed separation thresholds based on a distance or time. During the definition, a ''hockey puck'' collision-free region (CFR) is defined around each aircraft, and the self-separation is lost whenever an intruder enters that region. This definition method is simple and intuitive. In the low-altitude dynamic airspace, using the traditional fixed separation thresholds, the UAS either fails to detect the approaching intruder in time or makes too many unnecessary collision avoidance maneuvers, which lowers the operation efficiency and safety in this type of airspace. If flying at a slow speed, the UAS, due to its limited performance, may not be able to avoid colliding into a fast-moving intruder; the unnecessary maneuvers may occur if a receding intruder is close to the UAS. To solve these problems, it is necessary to define the separation thresholds according to the features of dynamic airspace environment.
This paper attempts to give a quantitative definition to the separation thresholds for UAS in airspace environment with high dynamicity and heterogeneity. For this purpose, the separation thresholds were defined adaptively to the surrounding airspace environment and the relative motion state between aircrafts. Specifically, a ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR was set up around the UAS. The horizonal size of the region, reflecting the performance of the UAS, was scaled in real time with the trend and speed of relative motion of the nearby intruder. The vertical size of the region was adjusted with the changing altitude of the UAS in the airspace. The simulation results show that the proposed ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR can constantly adapt to the surrounding dynamic airspace, achieve a low false alarm rate while ensuring safety, and balance the safety and operation efficiency in the airspace.
II. METHODOLOGY A. COMPUTATION OF ADAPTIVE SEPARATION THRESHOLDS
The separation thresholds are defined to minimize the unnecessary CAs, which may disturb the other aircrafts in the surrounding airspace, while ensuring the flying safety of the UAS. Unlike the traditional fixed ''hockey puck'' CFR [19] ( Figure 1 ), this paper sets up a ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR around the host UAS ( Figure 2 ), and takes it as the boundary model of separation thresholds.
Horizontally, the size of the ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR was adjusted automatically depending on the performance of the UAS, as well as the motion state and threat level of the approaching intruder. Vertically, the vertical size of the dynamic CFR was changed with the altitude of the UAS in the airspace. The greater the altitude, the higher the CFR. The separation thresholds are violated if an intruder enters the CFR of the host UAS.
1) THE CFR OF THE UAS IN HORIZONTAL DIRECTION
The horizontal view of the dynamic CFR is presented in Figure 3 . In the horizontal direction, the ''sector-like'' CFR of the UAS is delineated by the minimum safety boundary AB at the bottom, the floating safety boundary MN in the peripheral and the lateral safety boundaries AM and BN . The angular range β ∈ [0, π 2 ] is a constant, which is set to π 3 here. At the bottom of the CFR, the minimum safety boundary AB depends on the minimum separation threshold r min safe , which is set to r min safe = 600ft here. This is last line of defense against collision. If an intruder violates the minimum safety boundary, the UAS will avoid collision through emergent, violent maneuvers.
In the peripheral of the CFR, the floating safety boundary MN changes adaptively to the threat level of the nearby intruder and the physical performance of the UAS. In this paper, the boundary size is adjusted according to the relative speed of the intruder and the maximum turning ability of the UAS. The size of the dynamic CFR is positively correlated with the relative speed of the intruder, for a fast-moving intruder poses a high threat. By contrast, the UAS with a fast turning rate has a strong turning ability, and thus a small dynamic CFR. In this case, the UAS can make collision avoidance maneuvers later than that with a large CFR. If the intruder violates the floating safety boundary but not the minimum safety boundary, the UAS can avoid the collision gently and elegantly.
The lateral safety boundaries AM and BN are the tangent lines of the minimum safety boundary AB that pass through points M and N on the floating safety boundary, respectively. The two points are determined by the angular range β of the ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR.
The orientation of the CFR is the same with the direction of the relative speed of the intruder and the UAS. As shown in Figure 3 , δ is the angle between the line connecting the intruder position and the UAS position P = P int − P uav and the direction of the relative speed of the intruder and the UAS
. This conflict poses a high threat to the UAS. In this case, the separation is mainly maintained by the floating safety boundary of the CFR. The boundary can be determined based on the maximum turning rate of the UAS and the threat level of the intruder:
where r var safe is the floating separation threshold defined by the performance of the UAS f (w) and the threat level of the intruder D threat . D threat depends on both the relative speed |v uav − v int | and relative motion trend cosδ between the intruder and the UAS. The faster the relative speed |v uav − v int |, the more threatening the intruder, and the larger the separation threshold. The greater the value of cosδ, the closer the intruder is to the relative speed direction of the UAS, and the higher the intruder's threat level. In the extreme case of δ ≈ 0 • , the intruder is right ahead of the CFR, the threat level and separation threshold are both maximized. The performance of the UAS f (w) is measured by its maximum turning rate w max . The two constants k w and k a represent that the faster the maximum turning rate, the stronger the turning ability, the smaller the separation, and the less the necessity for the UAS to make early collision avoidance maneuvers. The minimum separation threshold r min safe is last line of defense against collision. If the actual distance d between the intruder VOLUME 7, 2019 and the UAS falls in (r min safe , r var safe ), then a conflict is about to occur. Then, the UAS can generate a conflict-free path using collision avoidance strategies [20] , [21] .
b: MINIMUM SAFETY BOUNDARY
The intruder P int is far away from the UAS, if it is outside AB(δ ∈ [θ 4 , π] U [−θ 4 , −π ] , θ 4 = π 2 + θ 1 ). In this case, the intruder has a low threat level, and the separation is mainly maintained by the minimum safety boundary of the CFR. The minimum safety boundary is the minimum separation threshold:
where r min safe is the minimum separation threshold of the UAS. If the actual distance between the intruder and the UAS d < r min safe , then the collision is imminent. To avoid the collision, the UAS must perform emergency maneuvers like climbing or crashing. 
where k MR is the slope of the lateral safety boundary AM . The value of k MR can be obtained from the coordinates of point M (x M , y M ), which depends on the angular range β of the ''sector-like'' CFR, and the minimum distance (r min safe ) between the UAS and line AM . Then, the value of θ 1 can be derived from k MR .k MR in the following steps:
(a) Describe the straight line L MR :
(b) Compute the distance d between O (0, 0) and line L MR :
(c) Let d be equal to the minimum safety distance r min safe (the radius of the small circle):
MR
= r, r = r min safe (12) (d) Simplify and solve the above equation:
Thus, we have:
Based on equations (4), (5) and (9), the ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR of the UAS in the horizontal direction can be expressed as (15) , as shown at the bottom of the next page:
2) THE CFR OF THE UAS IN VERTICAL DIRECTION
In vertical direction, the vertical size of the ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR changes with the altitude of the UAS in the airspace. With the growth in the height of the UAS, the aircrafts in the airspace flies at an increasingly fast mean velocity, posing a rising threat to the UAS. Thus, the higher the UAS, the greater the CFR. The inverse is also true. In the vertical direction, the ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR of the UAS can be expressed as:
where z is the altitude of the UAS relative to the ground. The vertical size of the dynamic CFR is 250ft, 500ft and 600ft above and below the center of the UAS, respectively, when the UAS flies in ultra-low altitude (z < 1000ft), low altitude (1000ft < z < 1500ft), and medium-low altitude (1500ft < z < 3000ft).
Equations (15) and (16) define the CFR of the UAS in the horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. During the flight, the UAS monitors the real-time position and motion state of each intruder in surrounding airspace, and calculates the dynamic CFR of the UAS based on the monitored results. If the intruder passes through the CFR, the separation thresholds are violated. Then, the UAS will issues a CA, and the UAS will adjust its path to maintain the separation from surrounding traffic.
B. CALCULATION OF MISSING ALARM RATE AND FALSE ALARM RATE
Missing alarm rate and false alarm rate are important indicators of the operation safety and efficiency of UAS in the airspace. The missing alarm means the system does not issue any conflict alarm although the UAS collides into the intruder. The false alarm means the system issues a conflict alarm, but the UAS does not collide into the intruder. The UAS may collide into the intruder if the missing alarm rate is too high. Meanwhile, an excessively high false alarm rate will suppress the operation efficiency and cause secondary collision. In this paper, the separation thresholds are adjusted dynamically to balance the two rates. The goal is to minimize the false alarm rate without sacrificing flight safety.
The trajectories of the intruder and the UAS were generated randomly, and used for 10,000 simulations under the same conditions. The missing alarm rate and false alarm rate were computed based on the simulated results on conflict, collision and successful conflict alarm (SCA). The conflict refers to the situation in which the distance between two aircrafts is smaller than the separation threshold, that is, the intruder has penetrated the CFR of the UAS. The conflict is an unsafe, non-destructive encounter, and usually lasts for a few minutes. The collision means a near midair collision (NMAC) is about to occur and usually lasts for a few seconds. The SCA indicates that the UAS has enough time to avoid collision after issuing a conflict alarm, that is, the time difference between conflict and collision is greater than k. The parameter k is the look-ahead time reserved for the UAS to effectively avoid collision after detecting a conflict. If k is too small, the CA is a surprise and the UAS cannot avoid collision in time. In this paper, the value of k is set to 5s.
The missing alarm rate can be computed as:
where n collision is the number of collisions; n not_SCA collision is the number of collisions without SCAs (the time difference between conflict and collision is smaller than k).
The false alarm rate can be computed as: FAR = n CA not_collision /n not_collision (18) where n CA not_collision is the number of conflicts that did not lead to collision; n not_collision is the number of non-collisions. Figure 4 explains how the dynamic CFR adapts to the surrounding airspace environment. The size and orientation of this region are adjusted adaptively to the motion trend and state of the surrounding intruders. This strategy is more suitable for low-altitude non-regulated dynamic airspace environment than the traditional approach, which uses unified and fixed separation thresholds.
III. SIMULATION VERIFICATION A. FEATURES OF DYNAMIC CFR
As shown in Figure 4 , Intruder 1 is the closest intruder, but it is receding from the UAS. Therefore, this intruder has a small threat level, and thus corresponds to the minimum separation threshold. By contrast, Intruders 2 and 3 are far away, but they are approaching the UAS, posing relatively high threats. As a result, large separation thresholds were designed for them. Despite having relative positions and speed directions, Intruder 3 has a faster relative speed than Intruder 2. Thus, the CFR against Intruder 3 is larger than that of Intruder 2, i.e. the UAS needs to make collision avoidance maneuvers earlier against Intruder 3. Figure 5 illustrates the impacts of intrusion speed on the size and orientation of the CFR. The relative position and speed direction between the intruder and the UAS remain the same. It can be seen that, when |V int | = 30, the intruder is outside the CFR, and the UAS does not need to make collision avoidance maneuvers; when |V int | = 60 and |V int | = 90, the intruder is within the CFR, and the UAS must make collision avoidance maneuvers. To sum up, when the other conditions are the same, the intruder moving at a fast speed poses a high threat to the UAS, and requires a large CFR which extends close to the intruder. Figure 6 displays the effects of intrusion direction on the size and orientation of the CFR. The relative position and speed direction between the intruder and the UAS remain the same. It can be seen that, the intruder approaching the UAS requires a large CFR which extends close to the intruder, i.e. early collision avoidance; the intruder receding from the UAS requires a small CFR which stays away from the UAS, i.e. collision avoidance is not necessary. Figure 7 describes how the maximum turning ability of the unmanned affects the size of the CFR. Obviously, the maximum turning rate has a negative correlation with the CFR size. This means the UAS with a fast turning rate boasts a strong turning ability and does not need early collision avoidance.
B. INFLUENCING FACTORS OF ADAPTIVE SEPARATION THRESHOLDS
r safe// =            r min safe + k v k w + w max |v uav − v int | cos δ, if cosδ > 0&δ ∈ [0, β) U (−β, 0] r min safe + k v k w + w max |v uav − v int | cos β * sin (β − arctan k MR ) sin (π − δ + arctan k MR ) , if δ ∈ β, π 2 + θ 1 U − π 2 − θ 1 , −β r min safe , others(15)
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON OPERATION SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY
Twenty-seven encounter scenes between the UAS and the intruder were designed, including three speed levels (low, medium and high) and three directions (opposite, cross-range and rear). Under each encounter scene, the speeds, directions and trajectories of the UAS and the intruder were generated randomly. Each encounter scene was simulated 10,000 times. Both our adaptive separation thresholds (AST) and the SARP's fixed separation thresholds (FST) were applied in the simulations. The missing alarm rates and false alarm rates of the two strategies were subjected to comparative analysis.
The simulation parameters are listed in Table 1 . It is generally believed that the UAS collides into the intruder when their distance is smaller than 200ft horizontally and 100ft vertically. The minimum separation threshold equals the minimum safety boundary in our ''sector-like'' dynamic CFR.
1) COMPARISON OF MISSING ALARM RATES
The missing alarm is defined as the UAS fails to detect the intruder, resulting the collision between the intruder and the UAS. As shown in Table 2 , the mean missing alarm rate of adaptive separation thresholds was 0.2%, much lower than that of fixed separation thresholds (9.5%), under multiple encounter scenes and motion states. Considering the relative speed between the UAS and the intruder, the adaptive separation thresholds effectively lowered the missing alarm rate.
From Figure 8 and Table 2 , it can be seen that the fixed separation thresholds worked poorly in high speed scenes. When the UAS or the intruder moved fast, the UAS had a high missing alarm rate using the fixed separation thresholds. The rate was almost 1 when both the UAS and the intruder were in rapid motions. Table 2 also shows that the adaptive separation thresholds performed excellent in cross-range and rear scenes, reducing the missing alarm rate to zero. By contrast, the fixed separation thresholds faced high missing alarm rates under these scenes, which severely endangers airspace safety. Moreover, it is learned from the table that the adaptive separation thresholds had high missing alarm rates in the opposite encounter scenes when the UAS and the intruder move at similar speeds. The highest missing alarm rate (3.7%) appeared when the two particles were moving at low speed at the same time. This is attributable to the adjustment principle of the adaptive separation thresholds: the thresholds are adjusted as per the relative speeds of the UAS and the intruder. When the two particles have similar speeds, the adaptive separation threshold is the minimum separation threshold. As a result, the UAS is late in detecting the intruder. To solve the problem, the UAS should take emergency collision avoidance measures like emergency climbing. The future research will explore how to maintain the separation when the UAS and the intruder move at similar speeds.
2) COMPARISON OF FALSE ALARM RATES
The false alarm rate is the ratio of the number of CAs that did not lead to collision and the number of non-collisions. As shown in Table 3 , the mean false alarm rate of adaptive separation thresholds was 6.2%, much lower than that of fixed separation thresholds (22.1%). Thus, adaptive separation thresholds can effectively ensure the operation efficiency in the airspace.
From Figure 9 and Table 3 , it can be seen that the false alarm rate was not greatly affected by the speed of the UAS, the speed of the intruder, or the encounter direction between the two particles. The different scenes can be ranked as high speed > medium speed > low speed and rear > cross-range > opposite by false alarm rate. In summary, the adaptive separation thresholds kept missing alarm rate and false alarm rate on low levels, and greatly outperformed the fixed separation thresholds. This strategy can effectively maintain the safety of the surrounding airspace and minimize the impact on airspace operation efficiency. The fixed separation thresholds led to a high missing alarm rate in the scenes with fast-moving intruder, especially those with rear and cross-range encounters, posing a serious threat to airspace safety. Meanwhile, adaptive separation thresholds always achieved low missing and false alarm rates, whichever the encounter scene or intruder motion.
The differences between the two strategies come from the definitions of the CFR. For adaptive separation thresholds, the size and orientation of the CFR are determined by the relative speeds and positions of the UAS and the intruder. In fixed separation thresholds, however, the CFR is defined as a fixed ''hockey puck'' region irrelevant to the relative speeds and positions of the UAS and the intruder.
The adaptive separation thresholds outshined the fixed separation thresholds, because its CFR is constructed according to the relative speeds and positions of the UAS and the intruder. This construction mode greatly suppresses the missing alarm rate and enhances the collision avoidance ability of the UAS. Of course, the adaptive separation thresholds need to be further improved for opposite encounter scenes, in which the intruder and the UAS moves at similar speeds.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a separation threshold computing method is developed for the UAS to autonomously maintain self-separation in dynamic airspace environment. In this method, the thresholds are adjusted adaptively according to the relative motion states and trends of nearby intruders, the performance of the UAS, and the altitude of the airspace. The adaptive separation thresholds can balance missing alarm rate and false alarm rate, ensure flight safety and reduce the disturbance on surrounding traffic. Moreover, this paper designs a tool to evaluate the impacts of separation thresholds on operation safety and efficiency in the airspace. The missing and false alarm rates were fully analyzed when the UAS and the intruder fly at three speeds (low, medium and high) and face three encounter scenes (opposite, cross-range and rear). The analysis shows that the adaptive separation thresholds greatly outperformed the fixed separation thresholds. The traditional fixed separation thresholds, whose CFR is shaped like a ''hockey puck'', does not apply to high speed scenes. The proposed computing method and evaluation tool provide important reference for preparing separation threshold standards for integration of the UAS into non-regulated airspaces.
